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THE THEATER JFACC CONSTRUCT:  
CREATING DISUNITY OF COMMAND IN THE CENTCOM AOR

by

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## **Abstract**

The U.S. Air Force and its sister services have historically wrestled over how to apply airpower to non-traditional forms of warfare. While airpower has been used in counterinsurgent operations since the 1916 Punitive Expedition against “Pancho” Villa, U.S. military doctrine has historically struggled to keep pace with this ever-evolving type of warfare, especially with regard to the role that airpower plays in asymmetric conflicts. The U.S. joint community’s recent rediscovery of the difficulty of counter-insurgent operations induced by the on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has required the joint force to take a hard look at how it conducts air-ground integration in this spectrum of operation. Involvement in these irregular conflicts has shown fractures in the joint air-ground team that is adversely affecting operations in CENTCOM today. The United States Air Force’s Command and Control Enabling Concept is the direct contributor to many of these fracture points.

This paper explores the proper level of airpower command and control in irregular warfare. By evaluating the current state of airpower effectiveness under the United States Air Force’s Command and Control Enabling Concept employed in the CENTCOM area of operations today, this paper will challenge this concepts utility and provide recommendations on how to improve air-ground integration in irregular warfare. Finally, this paper will advocate assignment of a Commander, Air Force Forces for all Joint Task Forces conducting joint air operations that utilize United States Air Force air and space expeditionary task force assets. By following this simple doctrinal guidance, the joint force of tomorrow will avoid the air-ground integration difficulties being experienced by the joint force of today.

## **Introduction**

Does the single theater Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in the U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of operation (AO) provide the requisite level of support to the multiple Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) the geographic combatant commander has tasked him to support? This is the question being debated among the different U.S. military services as the role of airpower in Irregular Warfare (IW) has once again become a controversial topic. Since complex discussions of this type require integrated solutions between all services of the United States (U.S.) military, this question needs to be resolved through inter-service dialogue and joint doctrine to determine the appropriate command and control (C2) construct for air-ground integration in IW.

Before beginning the discussion of airpower's role in IW, one must accept that the traits of IW differ significantly from that of major combat operations (MCO). IW is "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations [that] favors indirect and asymmetric approaches ... to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."<sup>1</sup> According to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, the USAF's centralized command and control (C2) structure optimized to fight MCO has shown severe weakness and an inability to provide effective air-ground integration for the decentralized operations of IW.<sup>2</sup>

A serious air-ground integration problem exists in CENTCOM today. A RAND research associate who recently returned from a fact-finding trip found that the USAF does not seem to have a voice in planning integrated ground operations. Apparently, this problem is due to nominal AF representation in CENTCOM's subordinate Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.<sup>3</sup> This observation was confirmed when the 2008 Air Force/Marine Corps Tiger Team (AFMCTT) sent to investigate air-ground friction points in



CENTCOM released the results of their findings. In the Tiger Team's report, they found the "presence of multiple JTFs within CENTCOM supported by a single [Commander, Air Force Forces/JFACC] presented non-standard command relationships and ad hoc processes not described in joint doctrine [resulting in] air strategy that was not fully integrated with the ground perspective, thereby limiting the effectiveness of [integrating] . . . the JFACC's strategic plan to the JFC's intent."<sup>4</sup> The Tiger Team went on to state that the current centralized Theater Air Control System (TACS) structure used in CENTCOM was neither organized nor equipped to support the highly decentralized nature of IW, and that lower levels of the TACS did not adequately support planning and execution of integrated air-ground operations.<sup>5</sup> Both of these Tiger Team findings were determined to be significant contributors to the air-ground coordination and integration difficulties experienced by the JTFs in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Based on the findings stated above, one question invariably comes to mind. Why does the USAF continue to present forces to multiple JTFs in the CENTCOM AO in a strictly support relationship through the single-theater Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)/JFACC construct rather than use the normalized JTF command relationship outlined in joint doctrine today? The answer to that question can be found in the tenets of the USAF's C2 Enabling Concept. In line with this C2 concept, a single warfighting headquarters (WFHQ), led by either a three- or four-star general, is assigned to serve as the Airman's single voice to the unified combatant commander.<sup>6</sup> As this singular voice, the WFHQ commander performs the function of the 'theater COMAFFOR/JFACC' through an Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) C2 element to optimize the application of airpower across the entire AO. At the core of the C2 Enabling Concept is the USAF's belief that this organizational change enhances airpowers capabilities. By integrating the combat staff of the assigned Air Force Forces (AFFOR) within

one AOC, the JTFs throughout the AO gain one air and space-focused warfighting structure supported by state-of-the-art C2 to support their needs. The USAF contends that this C2 Enabling Concept is the only way to compensate for shortfalls in both airpower and personnel and still accomplish the assigned mission.<sup>7</sup> The new organizational USAF headquarters construct that evolved from this C2 Enabling Concept includes the following:<sup>8</sup>

- A WFHQ commander that serves as the single theater JFACC
- An AOC
- A staff at the WFHQ to perform liaison and coordinating functions

The result of the USAF's decision to support multiple JTFs with a single COMAFFOR/JFACC has led to significant friction in air-ground integration in the CENTCOM AO. Although the concept of supporting multiple JTFs with a single COMAFFOR/JFACC is described in Air Force doctrine, it is not codified in joint doctrine and creates challenges to the airpower integration in the CENTCOM AO.<sup>9</sup> By removing the majority of Airmen from the staffs of ground units to a geographically isolated AOC far removed from the integrated planning process, the USAF has effectively validated the perception of the ground component that the USAF is not part of the joint team. In essence, by voluntarily removing itself, the USAF has essentially transformed the JTFs in both Iraq and Afghanistan into land component commands vice joint air-ground commands. The AFMCTT report states this best when it says:

Confusion over the central role [JTFs] have within the CENTCOM Theater of War combined with what some ground commanders view as a less than optimum [JFACC] arrangement, impacts the Air Component's ability to fully integrate airpower with ground operations. Over centralization, without adequate distributed command and control organizations and processes, reduces airpower's representation in strategy and planning. Thus, the Air Component is perceived by some as somewhat isolated, geographically and culturally separated from the JTFs they support. This confusion and the apparent reluctance by some in the Air Component to recognize that they are "supporting" Army-centric CJTFs, was one of the most significant and striking observations from the Tiger Team's visit to the AOR.<sup>10</sup>

After reading the comment above, it should become readily apparent to every reader that the single-theater COMAFFOR/JFACC construct outlined in the C2 Enabling Concept has created significant C2 boundaries and friction points to effective joint air-ground integration in the CENTCOM AO. Although senior Air Force leaders acknowledge the integration problem, they insist that the C2 Enabling Concept has value in that it efficiently utilizes scarce assets in a theater by placing them under the centralized control of a single COMAFFOR/JFACC. They argue that this concept effectively and efficiently allocates limited theater resources to cover competing JTF airpower requirements while also allowing the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC to maintain a vigilant focus on broader strategic goals throughout the AO.<sup>11</sup>

The following sections of this paper will refute this justification of the Air Force C2 Enabling Concept. This paper will argue that airpower is not being *effectively* integrated with JTF ground forces by showing that the single-theater COMAFFOR/JFACC in CENTCOM presents non-standard command relationships and ad-hoc processes neither described in joint doctrine nor designed for the highly decentralized nature of IW. To prove this point, this paper will show how the USAF's C2 Enabling Concept has taken "centralized control and decentralized execution" to the point where it now violates the principle of unity of command and the C2 relationships and component responsibilities outlined in joint doctrine. This paper will offer suggestions on how to improve both the C2 relationships and the planning and integration processes within the JTF to improve joint air-ground strategy development. Finally, this paper will show that the only method to achieve true unity of command and effective air-ground integration is for the USAF to reorient its focus on the operational level of war by abandoning its C2 Enabling Concept and adhering to the doctrinally accepted assignment of a COMAFFOR to a JFC whenever USAF forces are presented to a JTF.

## **The Elusive Search for Unity of Command**

*Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.*<sup>12</sup>

Joint Pub 1

*Unity of command is not alone sufficient. Unity of planning, unity of common item procurement, and unity of doctrine are equally necessary.*<sup>13</sup>

General H.H. “Hap” Arnold

Unity of command. Three simple words used to describe a principal of war that would seem easy to achieve in a military organization. Yet, this tenet has consistently eluded inter-service U.S. military combined operations from the Civil War to the present. There are many reasons to explain this: parochial interests, inter-service rivalries, and frequent, bitter battles for scarce financial resources are but a few. Nevertheless, with the conclusion of the Second World War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) realized the need to attain inter-service adherence to this principal of war if the U.S. military was to be successful in future conflicts.<sup>14</sup>

Seeking to prevent a reoccurrence of the difficulties experienced in the Pacific Theater during the Second World War when both the Army and Navy objected to subordination of its two major commanders to the other, a system for instituting joint theater command in the form of the 1946 Unified Command Plan (UCP) appeared.<sup>15</sup> In this capstone document, C2 of all assigned military forces was designated along non-service lines to a single military Commander-in-Chief (CINC) in one of seven geographic areas.<sup>16</sup> Aiming to achieve unity of command and unity of military effort by eliminating the chronic inter-service rivalries that had inundated U.S. military strategy formulation throughout the Second World War, the 1946 UCP failed to achieve its goals.<sup>17</sup> Two significant factors led to this failure. The arbitrarily defined geographic boundaries, coupled with the continued subordination of the CINCs to the JCS, led to the same inter-service arguments and rivalries that had plagued commands in the past.<sup>18</sup> The most

significant example of the UCP's failure was the non-unified, parallel C2 structures of each service in the Vietnam War. These separate command structures led to parochial competitions, constant infighting, and contradictory operational objectives that negatively influenced the U.S. military's performance and conduct of the war.<sup>19</sup>

“With [the] failure [of the U.S. military] in Vietnam, the limits of the UCP in dealing with ... a protracted, complex, full-spectrum operation became evident.”<sup>20</sup> Since unity of command was not occurring in Vietnam, a 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Board was impaneled to study the inter-service tensions and rivalries that continued to beleaguer the unified commands and the JCS.<sup>21</sup> The results of the Blue Ribbon panel were not surprising. Finding that unity of command was mostly cosmetic vice substantive, it reported that unified commands had “too broad a span of control, were excessively layered ... and too fragmented to provide for coordinated response to a general war situation.”<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, despite the damning condemnation of this report, the political strength and willpower was not resident in 1970s Washington, D.C. to enact the needed change.

Sixteen years elapsed after the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Board before a legislative mandate compelling U.S. military reform arrived. Two joint operations rife with inter-service rivalry and conflicting chains of command, the failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission and the poorly executed 1983 invasion of Grenada, finally propelled Congress to take action. Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger summarized the need for military organizational change best when he stated:

In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of “unity of command” is [indoctrinated]. Yet at the national level, it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed if, and only if, it applies at the [individual] service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.<sup>23</sup>

Troubled by the recurring parochial issues that “precluded the integration of [the services] separate capabilities [into an] effective joint warfighting [force],” Senators Goldwater and Nunn realized that sweeping changes to the organizational and doctrinal structures of the world’s largest bureaucracy, the U.S. military, were needed.<sup>24</sup> The result of their efforts was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganizational Act of 1986. Designed to make joint military operations a reality, Goldwater-Nichols “[placed] clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned ... and [ensured] that the authority of those commanders [was] fully commensurate with that responsibility.”<sup>25</sup> By establishing unified combatant commands along streamlined chains of command, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened civilian authority over the military by legislatively removing the JCS from the chain of the combatant commander. Instead, combatant commanders would report directly to the U.S. President through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), thereby eliminating the parochial influence and inter-service rivalry that hindered previous attempts at achieving unity of command.

Joint doctrine specifies two types of unified combatant commands. The first, geographic combatant command, delineates the geographical area of responsibility established in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) where the geographic combatant commander (GCC) has the authority to plan and conduct military operations.<sup>26</sup> CENTCOM is an example of a geographic combatant command. The second, functional combatant command, delineates the functional area of responsibility established in the UCP where the functional combatant commander (FCC) has the authority to plan and conduct military operations.<sup>27</sup> Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is an example of a functional combatant command.

Unified (joint) forces under the command of a JFC are established at one of three hierarchical levels: as a unified combatant command, subordinate unified (subunified) command, or JTF.<sup>28</sup> Constituted at either the geographic or functional level, the JFC “has the authority to organize assigned or attached forces ... to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS).”<sup>29</sup> No matter the hierarchical level of the joint force, one commonality exists between them all in that “command [by the JFC] is the most important function undertaken.”<sup>30</sup> Joint Publication 1 summarizes this best when it states that:

Command is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated CDR over assigned and attached forces [by virtue of rank or assignment]. Command and control (C2) is the means by which a [JFC] synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command. ...Unity of command is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets: clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships; information management; implicit communication; timely decision making; coordination mechanisms; battle rhythm discipline; responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; situational awareness; and mutual trust.<sup>31</sup>

Although command is the most important function for a JFC to perform, the term ‘command’ must not be confused with ‘combatant command’ (COCOM). COCOM is the Title 10 *command authority* over assigned forces vested solely in unified combatant commanders that cannot be delegated or transferred unless specifically authorized by the President or SecDef.<sup>32</sup> It is through COCOM that the combatant commander achieves unity of command in the joint force. By maintaining complete authority in the planning, employment, and execution considerations over all assigned and attached forces, the combatant commander retains ultimate responsibility for designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations in his AO.<sup>33</sup>

Since COCOM is *normally* not delegated, how does the combatant commander bestow the power to *command* upon his subordinates? The answer to this question is through the

delineation of command relationships. Joint doctrine specifies several command relationships that the combatant commander can use to designate command authority to his subordinates. Although operational control (OPCON) is inherent within COCOM, the combatant commander can delegate OPCON authority. The critical purpose that OPCON delegation plays in achieving military unity of command cannot be overstated. Since a unified combatant commander's primary focus is often on the strategic level of war, the prosecution of campaigns at the *operational level of war* frequently falls to subunified or JTF commanders. By delegating OPCON, the combatant commander gives subordinate JFCs the authority "to perform those functions of command ... involving organizing and employing [subordinate] commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."<sup>34</sup> Although OPCON delegation does not release the combatant commander of his COCOM responsibility for accomplishing the mission, the ability to confer OPCON to his subordinate JFCs grants them the independence to make decisions and assign tasks and objectives in a manner that maximizes capabilities of the joint force without first having to ask higher headquarters for permission.

The three levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical, help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions.<sup>35</sup> Although doctrine does not specifically delineate the size or type of joint force to use among the three levels of war, this author would be negligent if the operational level of war was not discussed since this will be the area of focus for the remainder of this paper. The operational level of war is where campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained where strategy is linked to task. However, to be effective in any campaign or operation, whether it be at the strategic or operational level,



unity of command with clearly defined roles, relationships, and responsibilities are required. Luckily for the JFC, joint doctrine provides this guidance.

Joint doctrine is indispensable to the JFC and the joint force as a whole. Serving as the overarching blueprint that integrates the unique contributions of each service, doctrine creates a combined-arms synergy among the services not otherwise achievable prior to Goldwater-Nichols. Joint doctrine is organized hierarchically to provide all levels of command within the joint force the guidance needed to execute the mission in a unified manner. The guidance found within joint doctrine “is broad, authoritative, and ...will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.”<sup>36</sup> Joint doctrine also always takes precedence over individual service doctrine with the additional mandate that service doctrine be consistent with joint doctrine.<sup>37</sup> The hierarchical relationship of joint doctrine is critical when one realizes that each successive level of doctrine must support the levels above and below with coherent and consistent guidance if unified action is to occur.

Since “command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort,”<sup>38</sup> Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, provides the capstone guidance on this subject. Understanding that unity of command begins with clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships, effective C2 of joint operations begins first by designating a JFC with the requisite authority to accomplish tasks using an *uncomplicated* chain of command.<sup>39</sup> Joint doctrine states that this chain of command begins with JFC designation of the JTF’s service and component commanders. Through this uncomplicated chain of command, unity is strengthened by adhering to the C2 tenets of implicit communications, timely decision making, situational awareness, and the mutual trust that exists between the service and functional components.<sup>40</sup> While the service component commanders are typically the senior service

member of a force provider, the functional component commanders are normally the service component commanders that provide the preponderance of forces for tasking and possess the C2 ability to control all assigned joint forces.<sup>41</sup>

Notionally, a JTF contains four functional components: a Joint Forces Air Component, a Joint Forces Land Component, a Joint Forces Maritime Component, and a Joint Forces Special Operations Component. This notional JTF organization is depicted below:




Figure 1. JTF Organization<sup>42</sup>

Since the commanders of these functional components convert JFC strategic guidance into operational objectives, these are the commanders' typically delegated tactical control (TACON) authority by the JFC over their respective functional forces available for tasking. Since this paper is concerned solely with the JFC-COMAFFOR/JFACC relationship, this will be the only one discussed.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, *Operations and Organization*, states that the commander of a USAF component at any joint level will be the COMAFFOR.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, AFDD 2 goes on to state that "if Air Force forces are attached to a JTF (thereby forming a JTF-level Service component), they should be presented as an AETF, and the AETF commander [will

serve as the JTFs] COMAFFOR.”<sup>44</sup> Air Force Doctrine makes allowances, however, for not assigning a COMAFFOR or an AETF to JTFs conducting operations. “In the case where [USAF] forces are operating in support of a JTF but are not attached to it, a separate JTF-level Service component under a separate COMAFFOR [will not be assigned].”<sup>45</sup> When this occurs, in accordance with the USAF’s C2 Enabling Concept, a single COMAFFOR at the GCC level will be responsible for the OPCON, TACON, and ADCON of all USAF forces assigned or attached within a theater. No matter the level of hierarchical assignment, however, the COMAFFOR is tasked with providing unity of command to the JFC[s] by being the singular point of contact for all Air Force issues.<sup>46</sup>

“When the COMAFFOR is delegated OPCON of the USAF component forces, and no JFACC has been designated, the COMAFFOR has the following operational and tactical responsibilities: (Note: if a JFACC is designated, many of these responsibilities belong to that functional component commander)”<sup>47</sup>

- Prepare air and space plans to support the JFC’s estimate.
- Develop and recommend COAs to the JFC.
- Develop an air and space strategy and operations plan on how the COMAFFOR plans to exploit USAF air and space capabilities to support the JFC’s objectives.
- Establish (or implement, when passed down by the JFC) theater ROEs for all assigned and attached forces.
- Make air apportionment recommendations to the JFC.
- Task, plan, coordinate, and allocate the daily air and space effort.
- Normally serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack, the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and other operations as directed by the JFC. As the supported commander, the COMAFFOR has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of these operations and attack targets within the entire JOA.
- Function as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as close air support (CAS), air interdiction within other components’ AOs, and maritime support.
- Act as airspace control authority (ACA), area air defense commander (AADC), and space coordinating authority (SCA), if so designated.
- Coordinate personnel recovery operations and combat search and rescue (CSAR).
- Direct and coordinate intratheater air mobility operations.

Although supporting multiple JTFs with a single-theater COMAFFOR/JFACC is described in Air Force doctrine, this concept conflicts with joint doctrine. Joint doctrine states that the JFC will *normally* designate a JFACC and assign him/her responsibilities to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations.<sup>48</sup> When making this decision, joint doctrine states that the JFC will normally select the service component commander that provides the preponderance of airpower to be tasked and the ability to perform C2 functions over these forces.<sup>49</sup> Although the JFC evaluates other considerations before making this decision, the COMAFFOR is most often selected to perform this role because the USAF's air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) normally provides the majority of air forces to the JTF and possesses the C2 capabilities to control component forces. In fact, the USAF prefers for its COMAFFORs to be designated as the JFACC, and plans and trains them to assume the JFACC's responsibilities if so designated.<sup>50</sup>

Once designated, the JFC issues the JFACC his commanders' guidance and assigns responsibilities. Although not all-inclusive, some of these responsibilities include:<sup>51</sup>

- Organize a JFACC staff manned with personnel from each component to reflect the composition of air and space capabilities and forces controlled by the JFACC.
- Develop a Joint Air and Space Operations Plan (JAOP) to support the JFC's objectives.
- Plan, coordinate, allocate, and task the joint air and space capabilities and forces made available to the JFACC by direction of the JFC.
- Develop daily guidance for construction of the air operations directive (AOD).
- Recommend apportionment of the joint air effort to the JFC after consultation with the other component commanders.
- Control execution of current joint air and space operations to include: counterair, strategic attack, counterland, countersea, counterspace, intratheater air mobility, and information operations.
- Coordinate personnel recovery operations, including CSAR, for assigned and attached forces, intertheater air mobility support, and SOF operations with the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or the commander, joint special operations task force (JSOTF).
- Assess joint air and space operations at the operational and tactical levels.
- Serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack, air interdiction, and theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Serve as the supporting commander, when directed by the JFC, for operations such as CAS, air interdiction within the land and naval component AOs, and maritime support

Essentially, the JFACC is responsible for allocating, coordinating and planning all joint air operations in the JTF AO in accordance with the JFC's CONOPS and air apportionment decisions.<sup>52</sup> The designation of a JFACC obviously eases the JFC's airpower strategy and course of action development. As the subject matter expert on airpower, the JFACC is the service member best qualified to coordinate the application of airpower with that of the other functional components to create a synergy of combined arms in the JTFs AO.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm is an example of the tremendous results that can be achieved when the JFACC fully integrates the air campaign into JFC's CONOPS. Citing the benefits of a short and clear operational chain of command, General Norman Schwarzkopf attributed the "very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders [that Goldwater-Nichols established for transforming the U.S. military into] a much more effective fighting force."<sup>53</sup> USAF officers give further credit to the Goldwater-Nichols Act for finally setting the conditions that enabled a single airman to command all air forces in this conflict.<sup>54</sup> In a CJCS memo to the SecDef, General Colin Powell agreed with the Air Force's position when he stated that "command and control of Joint Air Operations was the best in US military history."<sup>55</sup> The success of this well-coordinated air-ground campaign was a testament to the effect that Goldwater-Nichols had on the U.S. military. The key to achieving this success, however, was the development of joint doctrine mandated by Goldwater-Nichols.

Proving indispensable to the joint force in Desert Shield/Storm, joint doctrine provided coherent C2 relationships and logical roles and responsibilities for the component commanders. By clearly delineating C2 relationships and component responsibilities, a combined-arms synergy of military effectiveness was achieved on a scale never before seen in human conflict. With the success of this campaign, it appeared to all involved that Goldwater-Nichols had finally

accomplished the long sought dream of creating a unified fighting force in the US military.

Unfortunately, with the ascendancy of the AOC and the development of the USAF's C2

Enabling Concept, the joint fighting force would once again find itself in a struggle to achieve unity.

## Ascendancy of the AOC

*Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power are critical to effective employment of air and space power.*<sup>56</sup>

AFDD-1

The AOC ‘Falconer’ weapons system came of age with the publication of Air Force Vision Document 2020. In it, the Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael E. Ryan stated that:

We will strengthen the ability of our commanders to command and control aerospace forces. Their Aerospace Operations Centers will be able to gather and fuse the full range of information, from national to tactical, in real-time, and to rapidly convert that information to knowledge and understanding—to assure decision dominance over adversaries.<sup>57</sup>

Due in no small part to this vision, the AOC was transformed into the focal point where the centralized control, coordination, and appraisal of all theater air and space operations would occur.<sup>58</sup> The ascendancy of the AOC as a C2 hub would continue under the C2 Enabling Concept where the WF HQ commander assigned to a unified combatant command would become the theater-COMAFFOR responsible for Air Force assets across the entire AO. This new Air Force C2 Concept is depicted below:




Figure 2: USAF C2 Enabling Concept<sup>59</sup>

While serving in this capacity, the COMAFFOR reports directly to the combatant commander and exercises OPCON over all assigned or attached USAF assets available for tasking in the combatant command. No longer would properly tailored AETFs be attached to a JTF. Rather, the COMAFFOR at the combatant command level would now present all AFFORs in a strict support relationship to optimize application of airpower across the JTFs in the AO.

As stated previously, Air Force doctrine states that forces *should* be presented to the JFC as an AETF, and the AETF commander will serve as the JTFs COMAFFOR.”<sup>60</sup> AFDD 2-8 codifies this C2 relationship further when it states that forces are presented to JFC’s in a single, capabilities-based entity—the AETF.<sup>61</sup> AFDD 2-8 goes on to state:

The AETF consists of fielded forces, a COMAFFOR, and appropriate C2 mechanisms (an AOC and an AFFOR Staff). The AFFOR Staff is tailored to meet specific mission requirements. It supports the COMAFFOR as the senior operational-level component warfighter with established OPCON and ADCON of assigned/attached Air Force forces. When aligned to support a geographic combatant commander, the AFFOR Staff provides a capable, ready, and theater-smart C2 element for the COMAFFOR. *Regardless of the size of the Air Force element, it will be organized along the lines of an AETF.*<sup>62</sup>

However, with the adoption of the C2 Enabling Concept, the USAF has chosen to present forces to the GCC only, and to stop presenting forces to each respective JFC in the theater. What has not changed, however, is the USAF’s ardent belief in the efficacy of the AOC. (To simplify nomenclature, the remainder of this paper will assume that the COMAFFOR is also dual-hatted as the JFACC unless otherwise stated).

The JFACC’s primary means of executing his assigned duties is through the inter-service Theater Air Ground System (TAGS), of which the USAF’s Theater Air Control System (TACS) is the centerpoint and offers the most robust capabilities. As the senior component of the USAF’s TACS, the AOC is the operational-level C2 weapons system that facilitates centralized control and decentralized execution of air operations in an AO.<sup>63</sup> Centralized control and



decentralized execution of air and space power are the key USAF C2 tenets on which the TACS is designed to support. Centralized control “is the planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of air and space capabilities to achieve the objectives of the JFC.”<sup>64</sup> According to the USAF, centralized control of air and space power should be accomplished by an *airman* at the component commander level with a broad theater perspective so as to prioritize the use of limited air and space assets to achieve JFC objectives across the range of operations.<sup>65</sup> Decentralized execution “of air and space power is the delegation of . . . authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders to achieve effective span of control [that fosters] initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.”<sup>66</sup> The benefits of decentralized execution, however, are only realized when a commander clearly communicates his intent to his subordinates.<sup>67</sup>

As the senior element of the USAF’s TACS, the AOC is manned 24-hours a day and is the highest C2 node that the JFACC uses to control airpower in support of the JFC’s campaign plan. Often referred to as a combined AOC (CAOC) or joint AOC (JAOC), it will be referred to as an AOC for the remainder of this discussion. All AOCs are not created equal and are presented to the JFC in three variants: Falconer, tailored Falconer, and functional Falconer. Although their size varies, all are designed to serve as the focal C2 point for the TACS. “Through the AOC, the JFACC directs tactical actions to produce desired operational and strategic effects in support of the JFC's campaign using the fundamental principles of centralized planning and control through the AOC and decentralized execution by subordinate organizations and elements.”<sup>68</sup> Falconer AOCs are organized with five divisions (strategy; combat plans; combat operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and air mobility) and are nominally designed to be scalable and tailorable throughout the entire range of military operations.<sup>69</sup> However, AOCs are not stand-

alone systems in the TACS and require the capabilities of the USAF's Ground Theater Air Control System (GTACS) to function properly if the AOC is to perform efficient C2 of joint air operations.

Notionally designed to provide the optimum level of airpower integration with ground operations, the three elements of the GTACS, the Control and Reporting Center (CRC), Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), and the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) are critical actors in the centralized C2 of airpower. The GTACS is depicted graphically below:




Figure 3: Notional USAF GTACS<sup>70</sup>

The CRC is a ground-based mobile element subordinate to the AOC designed to perform primary theater command, control, and air surveillance facility within the theater”.<sup>71</sup> The ASOC is also a subordinate element of the AOC that plans, coordinates, and directs airpower for land

forces at the corps level and below. To accomplish this task, the ASOC “receives, coordinates, and processes requests for immediate air support as well as commits allocated sorties for immediate air support requests”.<sup>72</sup> The ASOC director, who is normally the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) assigned to the corps command, exercises OPCON of all subordinate TACPs. The TACP of the GTACS is the principal USAF liaison element co-located with U.S. Army maneuver units at the battalion to the corps level.<sup>73</sup> Directly subordinate to the ASOC, the TACP’s two primary missions are to advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of airpower as well as to provide primary terminal attack control of close air support (CAS) missions in support of ground forces.

The TACS elements described above form the essential hierarchical C2 structure that the JFACC requires to perform centralized control of airpower. However, another critical element of the JFACC’s team deserves mention in this discussion. Although performing no C2 function, the air component coordination element (ACCE) serves as the JFACC’s personal liaison to the headquarters components of the joint force. Tasked with integrating air and space operations within the overall JFC’s campaign plan, the ACCE is charged with communicating the JFCs and component commanders’ decisions and interests to the JFACC.<sup>74</sup> AFDD 2-8 is very specific about the non-C2 function of the ACCE when it states that it “should not replace, replicate, or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the component [or] JTF staffs.”<sup>75</sup>

As previously mentioned in the introduction, the USAF’s TACS is optimized for MCO. In this role, it performs well as evidenced by the successful air-ground campaigns of both OPERATIONS IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF/OEF). However, the shift to IW has exposed fractures in air-ground integration processes. These fractures will be discussed in the following section, along with the author’s recommendations on how to correct them.

## **Achieving Effective Air-Ground Integration in Irregular Warfare**

The nature of the current conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan has changed significantly with the end of MCO. The focus has shifted from the functional component commanders making decisions at the operational level of war, to the lower tactical levels of command where the highly decentralized fight is occurring.<sup>76</sup> With this shift to IW, air-ground integration began to falter. To investigate the reasons why, an AFMCTT was sent to CENTCOM. They found:<sup>77</sup>

- The shift from MCO to IW challenged traditional air-ground integration and C2 processes. To be effective, airpower needs to be tightly integrated with ground operations.
- The presence of multiple JTFs within CENTCOM supported by a single-theater JFACC presented non-standard command relationship not prescribed in joint doctrine.
- The current TACS is not organized or equipped to support the highly decentralized nature of IW.

The results of the AFMCTTs report are “consistent with other studies including the . . . Airpower Planning and Integration in IW Study [commissioned by the USAF and USN and] the RAND report on the TACS in Irregular Warfare.”<sup>78</sup> After viewing these findings, one thing remains clear: the single-theater JFACC construct embodied by the C2 Enabling Concept is not working effectively in the CENTCOM AO.

Disunity of command and effort is occurring in the air-ground team in CENTCOM today. The AFMCTT highlighted this point when it “noted confusion over command relationships at various levels, including disagreement as to who was the ‘supported commander.’”<sup>79</sup> Most alarming was the fact that almost every commander in the theater had a different viewpoint as to who was supporting whom.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, many Airmen interviewed by the Tiger Team held similar viewpoints when they stated “that the Air Component doesn’t work for the JTF commanders in Iraq or Afghanistan, but only for the CENTCOM commander.”<sup>81</sup> Even the

Airmen who understood their supporting roles were reluctant to accept the relationship that the air component was tasked to perform in this ground-centric decentralized fight.<sup>82</sup> “Some air strategists interviewed were even in the process of removing the words ‘supporting’ [and] ‘supported’ . . . from their air plans and strategy documents,” leading to the creation of a culture where staffers in the AOC believed it was acceptable to express disdain for supporting the ground component.<sup>83</sup> These types of discoveries led the AFMCTT to note “that . . . [this] confusion [over support] has the potential to affect unity of effort and limit operational cohesion [in the joint force].”<sup>84</sup>

A previous section of this paper outlined the necessity of achieving unity of command to be effective in military operations. Since command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort, the first step in achieving this goal begins by establishing clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships between the JFC and his components.<sup>85</sup> Joint doctrine, including JP 3-0 and JP 3-30, is based on a logical and normalized command relationship that states that the JFC has the authority to appoint a JFACC to synchronize all aspects of joint air operations. However, the JFCs in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been able to designate a JFACC or Air Force component commander within their JTFs because the USAF has not presented the JFC with an AETF led by a COMAFFOR. “Instead, with the CENTCOM Commander’s approval, a single theater-wide JFACC [construct] is being utilized to support [JTF] operations in the Horn of Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan.”<sup>86</sup>

The theater-JFACC concept continues “to frustrate some senior members of the [two JTFs] in Iraq.”<sup>87</sup> This is caused in large part by both the command and control limitations below the level of the AOC, as well as on the forced reliance of the ACCE at the JTF level to perform planning and C2 functions for the integration of air-to-ground power, roles that USAF doctrine

specifically prohibits them from performing.<sup>88</sup> The theater-JFACC concept is proving frustrating to the U.S. NATO alliance in Afghanistan as well. Colonel Ian Hope, an instructor at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, and former commander of the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group during OEF, summarizes this when he says;<sup>89</sup>

[That] establishment of a coalition air operations center (CAOC) for operations in the Afghanistan JOA... would alleviate current problems associated with reliance upon a singular CENTCOM CFACC/CAOC that provides ISR and CAS for competing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the current construct, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is severely disenfranchised, as there is no formal relationship between NATO and the CENTCOM CFACC (NATO officers are not even allowed into Qatar to serve in the CAOC as there are no standing forces agreements between NATO and Qatar). Presently, ISAF must work diplomatically through U.S. officers to secure the CENTCOM assets. This creates a perception among NATO partners that they are not receiving proper allocation of this support. This is unfair, because CAS remains one of the most reliable assets in Afghanistan, but the perception remains that NATO efforts are second fiddle to OIF and OEF by virtue of a command structure that cannot alleviate the suspicion.

The difficulties outlined by Colonel Hope are further complicated by the fact that ISAF, a NATO force, is not subordinate to CDRCENTCOM. Accordingly, ISAF will never reap the full benefits of US joint airpower in Afghanistan until an organizational change of the USAF command structure is made in CENTCOM so that ISAF can work more effectively and efficiently with the COMAFFOR. This less than optimum JFACC arrangement from the ground commanders' point of view has significantly affected the air component's ability to integrate airpower with the ground scheme of maneuver.<sup>90</sup> "Although the processes for planning and controlling air in support of ground operations are well documented in both joint and Air Force doctrine, these processes have been modified to allow the JFACC to retain more centralized control over airpower across the entire theater of CENTCOM."<sup>91</sup>

Over-centralization of airpower C2 at the AOC level is a well-documented problem, and is a problem that the USAF has created. By neglecting the lower elements of the TACS (CRC,

ASOC, and TACP) through inadequate funding, training, and personnel in order to maintain the ascendancy of the AOC, the USAF has forced planning to the highest level. Ironically, since IW demands decentralized planning at the lowest levels to be effective, the C2 construct used in CENTCOM today is the exact opposite of that needed. Direct support missions are now nearly 100% of the effort in CENTCOM.<sup>92</sup> However, the very TACS elements that require intimate involvement in the planning processes are the very ones that are largely non-existent in the TACS. Due to manning and equipment shortfalls in the CRC, ASOC, and TACP, the TACS has become a 'system' in name only in CENTCOM.<sup>93</sup>

This over-centralization of C2 has been further exacerbated by the USAF's decision to place ACCEs at the JTF level, vice the joint doctrinally accepted assignment of a COMAFFOR. ACCE personnel interviewed by the Tiger Team stated that their presence at the JTF, as a substitute for the COMAFFOR, has led to a significant level of distrust. "Perceived as 'spies' by the Army and as 'traitors' by the AOC, their frustration was so acute that one member commented that the ACCE was simply a visible face for JTF MNC-I to beat on."<sup>94</sup> The ACCE in Afghanistan was initially unwelcome as well. However, the Tiger Team found that this was largely due to NATO/ISAF sensitivities to the apportionment process of airpower for OEF in Afghanistan.

The air apportionment process has been a significant friction point among ground commanders in the CENTCOM AO. Air apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority devoted to various air operations for a given period of time.<sup>95</sup> However, the presence of multiple supported commanders in three AOs has significantly altered the doctrinal apportionment process for joint airpower.<sup>96</sup> Traditionally, the JFC assigns tasks and missions to his/her component commanders. The components, in

consultation with the JFACC and AOC, then integrate airpower into their land, maritime, and air plans and advocate for a portion of the JFC's total air effort.<sup>97</sup> Working closely with the other components, the JFACC then recommends how joint airpower should be divided to best support the JFC's overall campaign objectives. It is important to note, however, that the final apportionment decision is made by the JFC.

Although the aforementioned apportionment process is what is described in joint doctrine, it is not the process currently being used in the CENTCOM AOR. Rather, airpower is prioritized within each JTF's AO by the supported commander, with inputs from the JFACC provided by the ACCE.<sup>98</sup> In the event that the JFACC cannot meet the demands of the three JTF's, the responsibility of setting the priority and apportionment of airpower between the supported commanders falls to the CDRCENTCOM.<sup>99</sup> Apportionment between the JTFs for assets capable of ranging throughout the CENTCOM AOR has been delegated to the JFACC, and no formal process exists to adjudicate competing demands between the supported commanders.<sup>100</sup> It would be an understatement to say that this non-doctrinal, some would say random, multi-level JTF apportionment process by which to facilitate this critical function is a significant contributor to much distrust and friction between the air and ground components.

It should be readily apparent to the reader by now that effective air-ground integration is suffering in CENTCOM today. A major reason for this is due to the USAF's dogmatic adherence to its C2 Enabling Concept. In the evolution of its single-theater COMAFFOR command construct, the USAF has also effectively forced the single-theater JFACC concept onto the joint force in violation of joint doctrine. Forsaking the time-honored principle of unity of command mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the USAF's new command construct presents non-standard command relationships and ad-hoc processes not described in joint



doctrine nor accepted by the joint community. Furthermore, the over-centralization of both airpower C2 and planning functions at the AOC because of this Enabling Concept is the exact opposite of what is needed in CENTCOM today. IW demands decentralized planning at the lowest levels of the TACS integrated with that of the supported ground elements to be effective. Accordingly, changes in USAF C2 need to be made.

Discussion of an issue without a recommendation on how to improve it is merely a lesson in history. Many of the problems outlined above have been documented in other studies, articles, and theses. The following recommendations of this paper focuses on areas of improvement so that the joint force of tomorrow can achieve better results in air-ground integration than the joint force of today.

### **Recommendations**

First and foremost, the USAF needs to realize that its C2 Enabling Concept is not adequately supporting the joint force, and it needs to revert to the C2 hierarchy processes outlined in joint doctrine. By embarking on its non-joint doctrinal approach to the C2 of airpower, the USAF has reduced the effectiveness of the joint force by undermining the very C2 relationships needed to achieve unity of effort in the highly decentralized conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. To make the restoration of unity of effort a reality, a return to the JFC-COMAFFOR command relationships so clearly delineated in joint doctrine needs to occur.

Once this realization is made, the USAF needs to present AETFs, with attendant COMAFFORs, to each JFC in the CENTCOM AOR. By taking this simple step, the USAF will instantly regain the very thing it has lost. By dispelling the overall sense that they are “not in the fight,” the *mutual trust* of the ground commanders the USAF has been tasked to support will instantly be restored. Since a large part of the U.S. Army’s culture emphasizes the bond created

by shared personal risk and adversity, the willingness of the USAF to go forward to where the fight is will signal a commitment to the joint air-ground fight not achievable by any other means.<sup>101</sup> There is another worthwhile reason for taking this step. First, the benefit of USAF participation in campaign planning as part of a JTF, vice that of a distant supporting partner in a geographically separate area, will pay immediate dividends in the air-ground team. In fact, the USAF would do well to rediscover the lessons that Lieutenant General Pete Quesada learned in the European Theater of Operation (ETO) during the Second World War.

Upon taking command of the IX Fighter Command, Quesada understood the importance of airpower's role in supporting ground operations and wholeheartedly accepted the tenet that "land power and airpower [were] coequal and interdependent forces".<sup>102</sup> Because of that, he established a mentality in his organization that their primary mission was to provide air support to the ground combat element.<sup>103</sup> After impressing in his organization the primacy of their role, Quesada went about changing the mindsets of the ground commanders he was tasked to support. Fully understanding the prevalent viewpoint that Airmen were not interested in supporting the ground component, Quesada made it his number one priority to change these attitudes. By building stronger working and personal relationships, Quesada gained the confidence of ground commanders and repaired the inter-service rifts that ground commanders had previously experienced from Airmen. Frequently inviting ground generals to his headquarters for consultations, Quesada embraced a combined-arms approach to win the war that eased traditional air-ground rivalries.<sup>104</sup> General Omar Bradley, the ground commander Quesada was tasked to support, appreciated this attitude when he stated that "[he]...has done more than anyone else to bring air and ground closer together in this [European] operation".<sup>105</sup>

Only after accomplishing the dual tasks of getting his organization to accept their joint role and gaining the trust and confidence of his supported commanders was Quesada able to attack the mission at hand. Seeking ways to make air-ground integration more effective, Quesada understood that *effective communications* was the most critical task he had to master. From locating his command post throughout the campaign no more than thirty feet from General Bradley's to ensure that the IX TAC and First Army staff interacted continuously, to instituting more effective air-to-ground communications, Quesada's focus was always on increasing airpower integration. Quesada was so effective at this that when General Bradley was asked by General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower to rank the thirty most important American generals of the ETO, Quesada was placed fourth, the highest Airman on the list.<sup>106</sup>

The advantages of this *face-to-face* contact between Quesada and Bradley cannot be underestimated, and are even more relevant today in the current struggles in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Once a COMAFFOR is assigned to the JTF, the face-to-face contact between both air and ground commander and their respective staffs will reap huge dividends, leading to better integration in the decentralized fight of IW. When this occurs, the JFC will not only be able to organize his assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission, but he will also be able to achieve true unity of effort utilizing centralized planning and direction by being able to directly *task* his air component to achieve the JTF's campaign objectives. Although this will require an institutional commitment by the USAF to meet these personnel requirements, especially at the general officer level, the singularity of focus that will result when one COMAFFOR is able to focus on only one JTF mission will instantly restore unity of command to the joint force.

There is an additional reason why a COMAFFOR should be assigned to each JTF in CENTCOM. This assignment will serve as a tremendous opportunity for the professional

development of USAF one and two-star general officers in the COMAFFOR/JFACC role. While serving at the lowest unified force hierarchical level, the JTF, they will be better prepared for future assignments as a COMAFFOR/JFACC at either the unified combatant command or subunified command level. This experience, coupled with that received by the COMAFFOR's staff, will lead to a better-trained force and will undoubtedly prevent friction points in air-ground planning and integration in future joint operations.

The author's final recommendation in this paper is the abandonment of the single-theater AOC concept resident within the C2 Enabling Concept. In order to eliminate the over-centralization of airpower C2 and planning that is occurring with a single-theater AOC, an AOC-like capability needs to be bestowed upon the COMAFFOR at the JTF level. Resident within this recommendation is a commitment by the USAF to reconstitute its TACS, specifically its CRCs, ASOCs, and TACPs that are currently suffering from equipment and manpower shortages, especially in enlisted experience levels and rated officer manning.<sup>107</sup> As it stands now, the USAF's preferred C2 structure utilizing a single-theater AOC is too large and optimized at too high a command level to function effectively in the CENTCOM AO. What is required now is the necessary manpower and equipment in the lower-levels of the TACS to enable the COMAFFOR to effectively command and control the AETF. Once all of these aforementioned recommendations are incorporated, the USAF will be well on its way towards rejoining the joint community and the joint fight.

## **Conclusion**

It is the USAF's ardent belief that the advantages of centralized control and decentralized execution in the C2 of airpower at the combatant command level makes it unnecessary, some would say even erroneous, to assign COMAFFORs at the JTF level for military operations in the future. Although USAF doctrine advocates the C2 Enabling Concept as the best way to employ joint airpower, this paper has shown the importance of unity of command in joint doctrine and how this principle has been discarded in favor of the USAF's C2 construct in CENTCOM. This paper also argues that a renewal of unity of command in the joint force is needed and that the USAF needs to revert to established C2 principles by adhering to the JFC-COMAFFOR command relationships so clearly delineated in joint doctrine.

Failure to address these current problems with unity of command will result in the failure of the joint community and lead to disjointed integration and poor unity of effort in future joint operations, particularly those operations that require decentralized planning to be successful. The threats posed by ignoring joint doctrine in the on-going irregular conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be ignored. Total adherence to joint doctrinal C2 tenets by all the service components is not only critical, but is also, in the opinion of this author, non-negotiable. Serving as the overarching blueprint that effectively integrates the unique contributions of each service, observance of joint doctrinal C2 relationships will create a combined-arms synergy that is both comforting to our allies and frightening to our enemies. Therefore, it is the conclusion of this paper that the joint force return to the doctrinally accepted tenets of airpower C2 by rejecting the USAF's C2 Enabling Concept. By returning to the JFC-COMAFFOR command relationship, the joint force will once again be able to fight as an integrated and effective air-ground team.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0*, 11 September 2007, 1.
- <sup>2</sup> Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), “2008 Executive Summary of Air Force/Marine Corps Tiger Team (AFMCTT) Trip Report to the CENTCOM AOR,” [https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document\\_repository/Misc/AF%20Marine%20Trip%20Report-Final%2024%20Mar-CDR-3918.doc](https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document_repository/Misc/AF%20Marine%20Trip%20Report-Final%2024%20Mar-CDR-3918.doc) (accessed 10 October 2008), 1.
- <sup>3</sup> Bob Poynor, “Is Air Force Command and Control Overly Centralized?,” *Air University*, 20 June 2007, <http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0215/Articles/IsAirForceCommandandControlOverlyCentralized.htm> 1 (accessed 10 October 2008).
- <sup>4</sup> Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), “2008 Executive Summary of AFMCTT Trip Report to the CENTCOM AOR,” [https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document\\_repository/Misc/AF%20Marine%20Trip%20Report-Final%2024%20Mar-CDR-3918.doc](https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document_repository/Misc/AF%20Marine%20Trip%20Report-Final%2024%20Mar-CDR-3918.doc) (accessed 10 October 2008), 1, 5.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1
- <sup>6</sup> “Warfighting Headquarters (WFHQ),” *Global Security.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/wfhq.htm> (accessed 10 January 2009)
- <sup>7</sup> Bob Poynor, “Is Air Force Command and Control Overly Centralized?,” *Air University*, 20 June 2007, <http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0215/Articles/IsAirForceCommandandControlOverlyCentralized.htm> 1 (accessed 10 October 2008).
- <sup>8</sup> “Warfighting Headquarters (WFHQ),” *Global Security.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/wfhq.htm> (accessed 10 January 2009)
- <sup>9</sup> Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), “2008 Executive Summary of AFMCTT Trip Report to the CENTCOM AOR,” [https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document\\_repository/Misc/AF%20Marine%20Trip%20Report-Final%2024%20Mar-CDR-3918.doc](https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/document_repository/Misc/AF%20Marine%20Trip%20Report-Final%2024%20Mar-CDR-3918.doc) (accessed 10 October 2008), 8.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>11</sup> Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, “Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare” *Air & Space Power Journal* XXI, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 3, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/peck.html> (accessed 1 February 2009).
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